When you loose a brother so early in life, any information, pictures,or thoughts mean a lot. So thanks for mentioning Lt. John Manning. He is Karen Armstrongs brother. I tried to find a platoon that had John as a drill instructor. Thinking if they still had their yearbook there would be a picture of John in it........ Karen lost just about all photos of John in a house fire some years ago. I sent a cpl pics that we do have.

Thanks for your time !

~ Semper Fi ! Bill Norvell USMC 65-68

Posted by Sekou Shepard

I served with your brother in Vietnam and, for a brief period of time, Lt. Manning was my platoon leader. I recall one afternoon in 1967, as I and several others worked on reinforcing a bunker, Lt. Manning joining us as we talked about home. Although home was always a topic of discussion in Nam, that afternoon has remained with me over the years. And, although the specifics have long since faded from memory, the love for family and country which Lt. Manning shared with us that day, has not.

I was a few hundred meters from where Lt. Manning and Ben Stokes were that early morning of January 30, 1968. The following day was a difficult one for us there and, as we grieved, thought about their families back home. After all these years, there are still no words, but I hope that I can add to what you've always known. As a college professor and administrator for the last thirty years, I have often conveyed to my students that I once had the privilege and fortune to have known an honorable, brave and true leader. Your brother truly was a Marine's Marine and a great role model for me and many others.

God Bless,

Manuel Baca, PhD

USMC

Two and a half hours later, on the other side of the main Da Nang Bridge, Armed Forces police noticed two VC in the water and several sampans approaching. The MPs shot one of the swimmers, t(X)k the other man prisoner, and drove off the boats with a fusillade of bullets. Once more the enemy failed to cut the main lines of communication into Da Nang.''

Ill MAF also sent reinforcements. Lieutenant Colonel Twyman R. Hill's 1st MP Battalion operated directly under III MAF and was responsible for the "close-in defense" of the Da Nang Airbase, the two bridges between Tiensha Peninsula and the main airbase, and the Naval Hospital on the Tiensha Peninsula. The MP commander remembered that he received a telephone call at 0345 on the 30th from Colonel Thomas L. Randall, the III MAF G-3, who asked him to send three platoons to blocking positions south of I Corps headquarters." With one of his companies on the Tiensha Peninsula and the other three protecting the main airbase perimeter, Hill argued that he could not spare three platoons. He and Randall agreed that they would deploy one of the battalion's two reserve provisional Quick Reaction platoons composed of headquarters personnel. This platoon under First Lieutenant John E. Manning departed the airbase about 0415 and arrived in the blocking positions about 0515*.

Marine fixed-wing aircraft and helicopter gunships blasted the enemy in Hoa Vang. This apparently broke the back of the VC resistance. Under pressure from the Vietnamese relief forces and the Marine MP platoon, the enemy retreated with the allies in full chase. In the initial fighting for Hoa Vang, the South Vietnamese and Americans accounted for 25 enemy dead. In the pursuit, which amounted to a rout, the VC lost nearly 100 dead. In the attack on the I Corps headquarters and in the defense of Hoa Vang village the allies sustained losses of nine dead and several wounded. Among the casualties were two Marines killed, including Lieutenant Manning, and six wounded from the 1st MP Battalion.

*In his comments, Colonel Hill stated that he deployed only one of his reserve platoons. The battalion's monthly report, however, indicates that both platoons may have eventually moved into the blocking positions south of the I Corps headquarters. Col Twyman R. Hill, Comments on draft, dtd 29Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) and 1st MP ComdC, Jan68.

The Da Nang Northern Sector Defense Command dispatched a provisional company to assist the Combined Action Marines as well as the security detachment. The provisional company linked up with two South Vietnamese Ranger companies that were operating in the area to contain the battalion from the 4th NVA Regiment which had slipped through the Hai Van Pass the night before. With part of the force establishing blocking positions north of the hamlet, the rest of the provisional company and South Vietnamese Rangers moved through Nam O. By the aftern(X)n of the 31st, the Marines and Rangers had completed their sweep. They collected some 200 people that they detained for further questioning. Some of the VC in the hamlet fled south, but encountered a platoon from Company E, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines coming up to reinforce the allied forces in the Nam O region. In the resulting engagement, the Marines of Company E killed about 13 VC. The enemy unit was from the Q-55th Local Force Company, which normally operated in the area. A prisoner captured in Nam O identified a North Vietnamese battalion, probably from the 4th NVA Regiment, operating below the Hai Van Pass with the 'mission to form civilians for demonstrations.

According co a South Vietnamese account, the ARVN Rangers killed 150 of the enemy and captured another l S in the battle tor Nam O and in other fighting below the pass through 31 January. ARVN intelligence officers speculated that the battalion from the 4th NVA Regiment was supposed to have spearheaded the attack on the city of Da Nang the previous day, but arrived t(X) late to influence the battle.

The l st MP Battalion completed three sweeps of the airbase perimeter and the areas just southeast, southwest, and just north ot the airbase without incident. The battalions Company B, however, in an operation with a Combined Action platoon in two hamlets on the Tien-sha Peninsula or Da Nang East, surprised a VC force in two hamlets north of Marble Mountain. The Marines and Popular Force tr(X)ps killed 22 ot the enemy and took another 23 prisoner.

According to III MAF figures, from 29 January through 14 February at Da Nang, Marines sustained 124 killed and more than 480 wounded. Army forces in the Da Nang area including the troops from Task Force Miracle suffered 18 dead and 59 wounded. South Vietnamese and Korean casualties probably equalled or slightly exceeded the American. U.S. estimates of enemy casualties ranged between 1,200 and 1,400 dead. Colonel Smith believed that the 7 st VC Regiment alone lost about 600 men. The 2d NVA Division still remained intact, but obviously was not about to renew the offensive.85

From almost every account, the Communist attack in the Da Nang TAOR was very inept. Despite the thinness of the Marine lines and the ability of both the NVA and VC to infiltrate, the enemy never capitalized on these advantages. According to a VC after-action report early in the offensive, the writer complained that the "commander did not know . . . [the] situation accurately . . . and that orders were not strictly obeyed." In a 1st Marine Division analyses, the author commented that the 2d NVA Division's approach was "along a single axis of advance so that his eventual target was easily identifiable." Moreover, once the NVA units arrived south of Da Nang they "made no further attempts at maneuver even while being hunted by Marine and Army units, and when engaged, seldom maneuvered, except to withdraw." General Robertson, the 1st Division commander, observed that the delay of the 2d NVA Division into the picture may have been because the Communist forces "got their signals mixed ...." The VC were supposed to be inside "when the NVA division came marching down main street. You get your timing off and you've got problems." Another possible explanation was that the Da Nang attack may have been a secondary assault-to cause as much damage as possible and divert allied forces from the almost successful effort of the Communist forces to capture the city of Hue.

Brigadier General Paul G. Graham who was the 1st Marine Division Operations Officer (G-3) at the time disagreed with the last statement, writing "Hue had no military value to the NVA/VC. Da Nang was the prize-for success in that endeavor could have had a serious effect on the Allied efforts in the III MAF area." BGen Paul G. Graham, Comments on draft, dtd 20Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File).